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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE: WAC-02-214-51097 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: **DEC 28 2004**

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a restaurant. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a cook. As required by statute, a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor, accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, the petitioner submits a brief statement and additional evidence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. *See* 8 CFR § 204.5(d). Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing on May 28, 1998. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$11.55 per hour, which amounts to \$24,024 annually. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner from January 1996 through July 1996.

On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established on April 14, 1987, to have a gross annual income of \$1,000,000, and to currently employ 25 workers. In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted no evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage.

Because the director deemed the evidence submitted insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, on November 19, 2002, the director requested additional evidence pertinent to that ability. In accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the director specifically requested that the petitioner provide copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements to demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The director specifically requested such evidence from 1998 to the present.

In response, the petitioner submitted its Form 1120 Corporate tax returns for the years 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001¹. The tax returns reflect the following information for the following years:

	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>2001</u>
Net income ²	\$175	-\$89	\$245	-\$2,009
Current Assets	\$65,508	\$90,051	\$107,336	\$93,905
Current Liabilities	\$66,631	\$33,519	\$33,674	\$107,186
Net current assets	-\$1,123	\$56,532	\$73,662	-\$13,281

The director determined that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, and, on May 16, 2003, denied the petition.

On appeal, the petitioner states that it has the ability to pay the proffered wage and submits a letter from his certified public accountant, Mr. [REDACTED] (Mr. [REDACTED] and a compiled, but unaudited, "Statement Revenue and Expenses for the One Month and Nine Months Ended (Initial Calendar Year) December 31, 2002." Mr. [REDACTED] letter states that the petitioner's net income as reflected on the compiled financial statement is sufficient to pay the proffered wage. He also states that the petitioner "is moving to a brand new location and larger facilities in the City of Covina. This facility will be open in the next few months. The larger facilities including catering facilities will require several more new employees."

The unaudited financial statements that the petitioner submitted on appeal are not persuasive evidence. According to the plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), where the petitioner relies on financial statements as evidence of a petitioner's financial condition and ability to pay the proffered wage, those statements must be audited. Unaudited statements are the unsupported representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not persuasive evidence of a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner did not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage in 1998, 1999, 2000, or 2001.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in

¹ The tax returns are in the name of "Patnick, Inc., Taste of Texas," with the same address and employment identification number as the petitioner.

² Taxable income before net operating loss deduction and special deductions as reported on Line 28.

excess of the proffered wage is insufficient. In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

The petitioner's net income of \$175, -\$89, \$245, and -\$2,009 in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, respectively, are all lower than the proffered wage of \$24,024 and thus cannot demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date out of the petitioner's net income.

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.³ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets. The petitioner's net current assets during 1998 and 2001, however, were negative. Thus, the petitioner cannot demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date in 1998 and 2001 out of its net current assets. The petitioner's net current assets during 1999 and 2000, however, were \$56,532 and \$73,662, respectively. Thus, the petitioner can demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage in 1999 and 2000 out of its net current assets.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that it paid any wages to the beneficiary during 1998. In 1998, the petitioner shows a net income of only \$175 and negative net current assets and has not, therefore, demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage out of its net income or net current assets. The petitioner has not, therefore, shown the ability to pay the proffered wage during the salient portion of 1998.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that it paid any wages to the beneficiary during 1999. In 1999, the petitioner shows a loss of -\$89 but net current assets sufficient to cover the proffered wage and has, therefore, demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage out of its net current assets. The petitioner has, therefore, shown the ability to pay the proffered wage during the salient portion of 1999.

³ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that it paid any wages to the beneficiary during 2000. In 2000, the petitioner shows net income of only \$245 but net current assets sufficient to cover the proffered wage and has, therefore, demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage out of its net current assets. The petitioner has, therefore, shown the ability to pay the proffered wage during the salient portion of 2000.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that it paid any wages to the beneficiary during 2001. In 2001, the petitioner shows a loss of -\$2,009 and negative net current assets and has not, therefore, demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage out of its net income or net current assets. The petitioner has not, therefore, shown the ability to pay the proffered wage during the salient portion of 2001.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that any other funds were available to pay the proffered wage. The letter from Mr. MacBurney on appeal is insufficient evidence of the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date and does not overcome the deficiencies presented in 1998 and 2001. CIS may, in its discretion, use as advisory opinions statements submitted as expert testimony. However, where an opinion is not in accord with other information or is in any way questionable, CIS is not required to accept or may give less weight to that evidence. *Matter of Caron International*, 19 I&N Dec. 791 (Comm. 1988). Mr. MacBurney states that the petitioner is expanding its business and adding more employees but does not state how that will improve the petitioner's financial situation or produce corroborating evidence. Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. See *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). Mr. MacBurney's conclusory and speculative statements cannot outweigh the evidence of the petitioner's tax returns contained in the record of proceeding.

Despite the petitioner's demonstration that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage in 1999 and 2000, the petitioner failed to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage during the salient portion of 1998 or subsequently in 2001. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.